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BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF STATE
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND UNIFORM
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAWS UNDER ERISA: A
"UNIFORM PATIENT PROTECTION ACT"
1. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974' (ERISA)
aims to standardize employee benefit laws and protect the
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans2 by setting administrative and
substantive standards for the operation of employee benefit plans. In
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
2. 2. ERISA defines an "employee benefit plan" as "an employee welfare benefit plan
or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan
and an employee pension benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). This Note will address health
coverage under an employee welfare benefit plan. ERISA defines "employee welfare benefit
plan," in relevant part, as
any plan ... established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan... is maintained for the purpose
of providing[,] ... through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment....
Id. § 1002(1). ERISA does not apply to governmental plans, church plans, plans maintained
outside of the United States that primarily benefit non-resident aliens, excess benefit plans, or
plans maintained for the sole purpose of complying with laws relating to disability insurance,
worker's compensation, or unemployment compensation. See id. § 1003(b)(1)-(5).
3. Congress's findings and policy declaration for ERISA state in relevant part:
[O]wing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their
operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to
provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made
and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and
administration of such plans; ... [i]t is therefore desirable in the interests of employees
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enacting ERISA, Congress sought to balance the need for uniform
regulation of multi-state employers' 4 employee benefit plans with
states' freedom to regulate issues of local concern.5 Accordingly,
Congress furnished ERISA with a broad preemption clause6 and
and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to
provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring
the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
Id. § 1001(a). Accordingly, ERISA requires employers to disclose to plan participants and their
beneficiaries financial and other information regarding employee benefit plans "by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts."
Id. § 1001(b).
4. For the purposes of this Note, the term "multi-state employer" refers to an employer
whose operations are interstate in nature, and whose employee benefit plans operate, therefore,
on an interstate scale. See id. § 100(a).
5. See Nicole Weisenborn, ERISA Preemption and Its Effect on State Health Reform, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1985) (discussing ERISA's underlying purpose).
As states can best assess the health needs of their own citizens and enact laws to address
those needs, health care is "primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern." Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). States derive their authority to regulate health care
from the state police power, which states, in turn, derive from the Tenth Amendment. See
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (holding that state police power necessarily
includes the authority "to enact quarantine laws and 'health laws of every description' (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824))). If state health care regulation conflicts with a
unique federal interest, however, such as Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, the
pertinent federal law will preempt the state regulation. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2
(Supremacy Clause); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal
Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993) (providing an
overview of traditional preemption analysis).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Section 514(a) of ERISA provides, in relevant part, that
ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan . Id. ERISA defines "State Law" as "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." Id. § 1144(c)(1).
The Supreme Court has summarized Congress's underlying purpose for enacting ERISA's
broad preemption clause:
An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits
undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants,
calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds
for benefit payments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply with
applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient way to meet these
responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
Neither the House nor the Senate originally contemplated including such a broad preemption
provision in ERISA. See Jolee Ann Hancock, Comment, Diseased Federalism: State Health
Care Laws Fall Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 383, 390-95 (1994-95). The
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elected to regulate the administration of benefit plans rather than
regulate employees' substantive rights to benefits under such plans.
Although ERISA provides some substantive protections for
pension plan participants and their beneficiaries, it provides virtually
no such protection for participants in, and beneficiaries of, health
benefit plans or other welfare plans.7 Despite ERISA's lack of
substantive standards for health benefit plans, courts have broadly
interpreted ERISA's preemption clause and narrowly construed
exceptions to ERISA preemption in order to protect the free market
of health insurance. 8 These judicial interpretations of ERISA have
posed great challenges to state health care reform initiatives. 9 As the
broad scope of ERISA preemption has thus thwarted many states'
legislative efforts to reform health care,'0 and as comprehensive
health care reform has not occurred on a national level," a
"regulatory vacuum ' 12 now exists in the health care arena. This
regulatory vacuum has rendered essential the establishment of an
appropriate balance between ERISA's objective of providing uniform
employee benefit laws and the states' interests in enacting consumer-
oriented health care reform measures.
Part II of this Note provides a summary of the current state of
health care in the United States. Part III examines both the role that
Conference Committee, which convened to resolve discrepancies between the House and
Senate versions of ERISA, adopted section 514(a)'s broad "relationship to any employee
benefit plan" preemption standard after the Committee's final negotiations. See H.lL REP. No.
93-1280, at 383 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5162. The Committee then
presented ERISA's broader preemption clause to Congress only ten days before Congress
passed the legislation. See id. For a discussion of the preemption provisions that the House and
the Senate originally considered, see Hancock, supra, at 390-95.
7. See Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative
Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 47, 55-56 (1988). Schaffer and Fox
characterize ERISA's effect on health insurance as "semi-preemption" because it allows states
to regulate some aspects of health insurance if the employer purchases insurance rather than
insuring employees itself. See id. at 48; see also infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the preemption analyses used by federal courts in invalidating state
laws, see infra Part I.A-B.
9. These challenges are manifest in current litigation involving ERISA preemption of
state "Any Willing Provider" statutes. See discussion infra Part I.C.
10. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text and Part I.
11. See discussion infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. One of ERISA's drafters originally coined the term "regulatory vacuum" to describe
ERISA's preemptive effect on health care law. See Schaffer & Fox, supra note 7, at 48.
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ERISA has played in preventing states from enacting consumer-
oriented health care reform legislation and the judicial interpretation
of ERISA's preemption clause. Part III also discusses the burgeoning
ERISA-state health care debate in recent litigation over the viability
of "any willing provider" statutes. Part IV analyzes the competing
interests of state health care reform and uniform employee benefit
laws, drawing upon recent Supreme Court decisions, Circuit Court
decisions, and practical consequences of some state laws that survive
a preemption challenge. Part V then proposes the enactment of a
Uniform Patient Protection Act. Such an Act would effectively
address state health care reform initiatives while avoiding preemption
by ERISA. Part V additionally proposes that Congress amend ERISA
to require that all employers who self-insure their employee benefit
plans meet certain minimum certification standards, thereby
guaranteeing standard protection to all employees who receive health
coverage through their employers' plans.1
3
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF HEALTH CARE AND THE CALL FOR
REFORM
Health care reform is one of the most important political issues of
this decade. Reform is necessary for several economic reasons.
Health care accounts for approximately fourteen percent of the
United States's gross national product,' 4 yet approximately forty
million Americans do not have health insurance.15 Moreover,
advances in medical technology have caused an increase in overall
health care expenditures as patients request, and doctors occasionally
prescribe, unnecessary tests or procedures.' 6 To complicate matters,
13. Under ERISA's deemer clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994), employers who
self-insure their employee benefit plans are exempt from state insurance regulations. As a
result, state legislatures that enact health care reform legislation through their power to regulate
insurance are currently unable to guarantee that self-insured employee benefit plan participants
and beneficiaries will receive the protection of state health care laws. See discussion infra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
14. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., MANAGED COMPETITION AND
ITS POTENTIAL TO REDUCE HEALTH SPENDINGS 1 (1993).
15. See id.
16. In addition, the increase in medical malpractice litigation has caused an increase in the
practice of "defensive medicine." Defensive medicine is the medical practice by which health
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the human life expectancy is now longer than ever before; and as the
amount of money expended for medical care during the last few
months of an individual's life steadily has increased, insurance
premiums and Medicare expenditures have skyrocketed.
17
Any discussion of health care reform must address the emergence
of "managed care" in the health care industry.18 Managed care
organizations charge their members a fixed rate for health care
services and administer the health care that each member receives. 19
Managed care organizations operate under an efficiency-driven
strategy, employing practices such as utilization review,20 the use of
gatekeepers,2 ' capitation,22  pre-admission certification, co-
care practitioners go beyond simply erring on the side of caution and perform marginally
necessary tests or procedures in order to decrease their risk of incurring malpractice liability.
See id.
17. See Rashi Fein, Health Care Reform, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 275,
276-77 (Peter Conrad & Rochelle Kern eds., 4th ed. 1994).
18. The shift from traditional fee-for-service health care to managed care began in the
1980s. The shift occurred in response to the economic status of America's health care industry
in the 1980s. During the 1980s, health care costs steadily increased while patient volume for
physicians and hospitals decreased. See D. H. COWAN, PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
34 (1984). This decreased volume was attributable in part to the continuing growth of the pool
of practicing physicians, combined with patients' reluctance to seek preventive or non-
emergency care. See id. In addition, increases in unemployment during the 1980s created a
larger pool of uninsured Americans, many of whom could not afford to seek non-emergency
care and treatment. See Patricia A. Butler, New Initiatives in Financing and Delivering Health
Care for the Medically Indigent: Report on a Conference, 13 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 225,
229 (1985). Furthermore, the growing number of physicians, combined with the decline in
patient volume, ultimately created greater competition among health care practitioners and,
thus, greater financial pressure on the health care industry. See Cathy L. Burgess, Comment,
Preferred Provider Organizations: Balancing Quality Assurance and Utilization Review, 4 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 275, 278 (1988).
19. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, HEALTH CARE LAW 1993, at 549-50 (1993);
Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 Am. J.L.
& MED. 301 (1996).
20. Also referred to as "cost-efficient medicine," utilization review is a cost-containment
mechanism that controls the administration of care received by patients. See Burgess, supra
note 18, at 282-83.
21. In a managed care organization, a gatekeeper physician, usually a primary care
practitioner, evaluates patients' health to determine whether their conditions warrant additional
medical attention by other network practitioners. See id. at 283.
22. Under a system of capitation, a payor, such as an employer, pays a managed care
organization a set rate per patient to provide health care services to the payor's designated
group of patients. Presumably, a health care provider affiliated with managed care organization
will have cost-containment incentives to provide only necessary services. This follows from the
fact that health care providers assume the actual cost of providing treatment. See Kinney, supra
1998]
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payments,24 and the requirement of second opinions for medical
treatment. The managed care industry is comprised of two primary
entities: Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred
Provider Organizations (PPOs). HMOs provide enrollees with
comprehensive health care services under pre-paid plans25 by directly
contracting with health care providers. By contracting exclusively
with network practitioners for a pool of enrollees and by charging
enrollees capitated premiums, HMOs aim to guarantee access to all
necessary health care with the network's own resources.26 HMOs also
embody a risk-shifting element. By accepting capitated payments
from enrollees, HMOs assume the risk that some enrollees may
require care in excess of the value of their paid premiums. Moreover,
by providing cost-containment financial incentives to the
practitioners within the network, HMOs shift a degree of that risk to
the practitioners.27
PPOs contract with a panel of health care providers to provide
medical services to enrollees on a discounted fee-for-service basis or
through another payment mechanism. 28 PPOs also may provide
note 19, at 301.
23. Pre-admission certification is a process by which managed care organizations can
determine the medical necessity of a scheduled inpatient medical procedure. Managed care
organizations may also use pre-admission certification when a patient requests a procedure
performed on an outpatient basis, or when a patient requests otherwise expensive health care
treatment, such as physical therapy. See Burgess, supra note 18, at 282.
24. Managed care organizations typically require co-payments in one of two situations.
First, a plan participant may seek treatment for which the plan does not provide full coverage,
such as dermatology. Second, a plan participant may seek care or treatment from a practitioner
who is not a member of the managed care network. Some "looser" managed care networks,
such as a Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), will pay a portion of a participant's costs to
visit such a non-member practitioner, however, it is more cost-efficient for a participant to seek
care from practitioners who are members of the PPO's network. See id. at 276.
25. Once enrolled in an HMO, enrollees typically pay, if anything, only a co-payment for
services. However, in non-emergency situations, enrollees may use only the HMO's provider
network in order to receive coverage. See Robert A. Blum & William F. Brossman, Basic Legal
Issuesfor Employers in Managed Care, C799 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 509,514-15 (1993).
26. See id.; see also Jeffrey B. Schwartz, The Preferred Provider Organization as an
Alternative Delivery System, 6 . LEGAL MED. 149, 150 (1985) (discussing basic theories
underlying the practices of liMOs).
27. See Blum & Brossman, supra note 25, at 515; see also Gary A. Francesconi, Note,
ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider" Laws-An Essential Step Toward National
Health Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227, 229 n.10 (1995) (discussing basic features of
HMOs).
28. See Burgess, supra note 18, at 275-76.
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utilization and claims reviews. PPOs are distinguishable from HMOs
in several ways. First, PPOs provide enrollees with more choices in
care and treatment by enabling enrollees to seek services from
practitioners outside of the network.29 Second, PPOs exert less
administrative power over the care that enrollees may receive
because they operate on a fee-for-service basis rather than a
capitation basis.30  Third, PPOs do not shift to their member
practitioners the risk that services might exceed enrollee payments.
Instead, PPO payors accept the risk of the enrollees' need for more
extensive treatment.3
Managed care provides both advantages and disadvantages to
enrollees of employee health benefit plans. Advantages of managed
care include discounted health care costs and the elimination of
unnecessary medical tests and procedures.32 On the other hand,
several disadvantages inhere in the organization of managed care
employee health benefit plans. Enrollees in managed care networks
usually sacrifice some degree of choice when selecting their medical
care practitioners. This sacrifice is necessary because managed care
networks typically limit the number of health care providers that are
available to their enrollees.33 When employers provide managed care
health coverage, employees may not have the financial resources to
seek alternative means of obtaining health care if the managed care
29. However, PPOs usually pay only a small portion of the discounted fee offered by
network practitioners. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 150.
30. See Francesconi, supra note 27, at 229 n.8.
31. See id. In addition to HMOs and PPOs, other more choice-oriented managed care
entities have emerged in recent years. A Point of Service ("POS") Plan combines features of
both HMOs and PPOs with traditional indemnity features to enable enrollees to determine the
level of benefits they receive, based upon their choice of provider and whether the provider
adheres to the plan's requirements. See Rebecca L. Jackson & Karen W. Levy, Innovations in
Managed Care, in HEALTH CARE REFORM LAW INSTITUTE 1994, 249, 253-54 (PLI Com. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 700, 1994). Another entity, the Physician-Hospital
Organization, contracts with managed care plans to arrange medical and hospital services. See
id. at 254. Additionally, an Integrated Health Care Delivery System, encompassing one or more
hospitals, a large number of physicians, and a broad range other health care practitioners, may
offer its own managed care system. See id. at 258.
32. See Vemellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk
Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1994).
33. See The Health Care Study Group, Understanding the Choices in Health Care
Reform, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 499, 531-32 (1994).
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plan is unsatisfactory.34 Critics of managed care networks also note
that the networks are disadvantageous to practitioners because
managed care networks routinely shut out non-network
practitioners.35 As a result, these practitioners lose a large volume of
patients who cannot afford to continue seeking their services after
having joined a managed care network.
In recent years, managed care's conflicting goals of containing
costs and providing quality health care have clashed violently as
health care reform has moved to the forefront of political debate.
Despite the general consensus that health care reform is necessary,
3 6
efforts to accomplish comprehensive reform on a national level have
failed.37 As a result, many state legislatures have passed their own
34. See id. at 532. For example, if an employee's long-time family physician does not
belong to the managed care network, the employee has a financial disincentive to maintain that
well-established relationship because the network likely will not contribute to the employee's
expense of seeking care outside of the network. See id. This scenario is more likely if the
employee belongs to a "closed" HMO that refuses to provide co-payments to practitioners with
which it has not contracted. See VERGIL N. SLEE & DEBORA A. SLEE, HEALTH CARE TERMS
195, 195 (2d ed. 1991).
35. See Susan D. Goold, Allocating Health Care: Cost-Utility Analysis, Informed
Democratic Decision Making or the Veil ofIgnorance?, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 69, 77
(1996).
36. See Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 609, 610 (1995); William . Bahr, Comment, Although Offering More Freedom
to Choose, "Any Willing Provider" Legislation Is the Wrong Choice, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 557,
559-61 (1997).
37. For example, in 1993 Congress rejected President Clinton's proposed Health Security
Act (HSA), H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993), S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993). The HSA would have
benefited Americans in three ways. First, it provided for standardized benefit packages and
forms. See Bruce W. Karrh, Health Care Reform in the United States, 13 DEL. LAW. 17, 19
(1995). Second, it provided for universal health care coverage by broadening the present
employer-based system of health insurance and creating greater tax incentives for employers to
provide such coverage to their employees. See id. Third, from a quality-of-care standpoint, the
HSA focused on preventive health care. See id. However, the HSA had its drawbacks. Most
significantly, the plan was so complicated that implementing it likely would have required the
creation of a new governmental bureau. Additionally, some critics opposed the HSA because it
would have resulted in inconsistencies among the various states' laws by giving states too much
regulatory authority. Critics claimed that such inconsistencies would have caused compliance
problems for multi-state employers. See id. One further drawback of the HSA was that it
focused only minimally on medical malpractice issues. See id.
Another reform plan, the proposed Managed Competition Act of 1993 (MCA), H.R. 3222,
103d Cong. (1993), received significant attention in the 103d Congress. Sponsored by
Congressmen Cooper (D-Tenn.) and Grandy (R-Iowa), the MCA, like the HSA, provided for an
employer-based system of coverage. Also like the HSA, the MCA provided for a standard
benefits package and focused on prevention. See Karrh, supra, at 19-20 (outlining elements of
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reform legislation, much of which aims to improve the quality of38
health care that patients receive in managed care systems. Much of
the proposed legislation). It also undertook the task of Medicare and Medicaid reform and
established an outcome and patient satisfaction data system to guide future improvements. The
premise of the MCA derived from "managed competition," see id., which occurs "when health
care providers compete to provide services through a market driven by purchasers of health care
insurance. The theory is that an improved health care market will emerge from competition
based on quality and cost." Francesconi, supra note 27, at 227 nA. Congress ultimately rejected
the MCA because it did not require employer-provided health insurance, because it abolished
Medicare, and because it had inadequate tax provisions. See Karrh, supra, at 20. For further
discussion of health care reform legislation that failed to win both House and Senate approval,
see generally id.
Congress finally advanced a step toward health care reform by passing the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 105-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
The stated objectives of HIPAA are
to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health
care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to
long-term care services and coverage, [and] to simplify the administration of health
insurance ....
Pub. L. No. 105-191, preamble 110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996).
To accomplish increased insurance portability, HIPAA limits pre-existing condition
exclusions, prohibits discrimination against individual participants and beneficiaries based on
health status, and guarantees renewability in multi-employer plans and multiple employer
welfare arrangements. See id. § 701. In addition, HIPAA increases the portability of group
market health insurance by limiting pre-existing condition exclusions, prohibiting
discrimination against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health status,
guaranteeing availability of individual health insurance coverage to certain individuals with
prior group coverage, and guaranteeing renewability of individual health insurance coverage.
See id. § 702. Additionally, to prevent health care fraud and abuse, HIPAA establishes a Fraud
and Abuse Control Program. See id. §§ 200-271, 110 Stat. at 1937-38. Finally, HIPAA creates
tax incentives for medical savings accounts. Medical savings accounts are trust or custodial
accounts created for the sole benefit of the account holder. Such accounts permit deductions
from individual income taxes. For example, employer MSA contributions will be excludable
from an employee's taxable income. See id. §§ 300-323, 110 Stat. at 1938. Although HIPAA
represents an important advance in the evolution of health care reform, it fails to address many
of the quality of care issues arising in today's health care marketplace.
38. For example, during 1995 more than twenty state legislatures considered bills targeted
toward managed care organizations. See George Anders & Laura Johannes, Doctors Are Losing
a Lobbying Battle to HMOs, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1995, at B1. Critics of these states'
legislative efforts to improve the quality of health care have dubbed such state efforts "anti-
managed care" legislation on the basis that they disregard the objectives of administrative
efficiency and cost containment. For example, the Model Patient Protection Act, sponsored by
the American Medical Association in 1994, would have required a managed care plan to
disclose to prospective enrollees detailed information regarding the plan's terms, conditions,
and contracts with its providers. See Bruce D. Platt & Lisa D. Stream, Dispelling the Negative
Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis of Anti-Managed Care Legislation and the Quality of
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this reform legislation is based on the American Medical
Association's Model Patient Protection Act,39 and generally is
referred to as "patient protection legislation." Typical patient
protection legislation may provide for HMO disclosure requirements,
direct access to specialists such as OB/GYNs, processes for appealing
denied claims, minimum hospital maternity stays, mandated coverage
for emergency room visits, and prohibitions against "gag clauses
' 'A
in physician contracts.41 Not surprisingly, the managed care industry
has criticized these reform efforts. For example, HMO proponents
argue that required disclosure of plan terms, conditions, and provider
contracts would overload participants with information.42 In addition,
HMO proponents argue that direct access to specialists would
increase the unnecessary use of these practitioners and would
undermine the gatekeeper's function of determining the most proper
and cost-effective course of treatment.43  Furthermore, HMO
proponents contend that existing HMO grievance procedures
Care Provided By Health Maintenance Organizations, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 489, 493-94
(1995). In addition, the Act would have required each plan to establish a system for
credentialing practitioners and prevented HMOs from rejecting qualified practitioners who
applied for credentials. See id. at 496. Furthermore, the Act reserved to physicians, rather than
to plan administrators, the authority to make decisions concerning treatment and denial of
coverage. See id. at 496-97 (discussing Florida's version of the Model Patient Protection Act).
39. See supra note 38 for a discussion of the American Medical Association's Model
Patient Protection Act.
40. A gag clause prohibits physicians from disclosing to patients information about
coverage limits and capitation incentives that a network has instituted to reduce its operating
costs. Gag clauses have received considerable criticism from physicians who claim that
disclosing such information could result in termination of their affiliation with the network or
the receipt of fewer referrals. See DAVID HIMMELSTEIN & STEFFIE WOOLHANDLER, THE
NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM BOOK 218 (1994); Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan.
22, 1996, at 44.
41. See American Political Network, Statelines 50-State Report 1: AHL Tracks Health
Care Activity, AMER. HEALTH LINE, June 7, 1996, available in Westlaw, 6/7/96 APN-HE 5.
Some state legislatures have gone beyond patient protection legislation and enacted broader
health care reform measures in an effort to provide universal health coverage and restructure
delivery systems. See, e.g., The Oregon Health Plan, OR. REV. STAT. 442 et seq. (1993). For a
discussion of Oregon's ration-based health care system, see generally Eric Lamond Robinson,
Note, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 977
(1992); Kenneth K. Schmitt, Comment, Waiver Quest: Oregon's Attempt to Re-Ration Health
Care, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 947 (1992).
42. See Platt& Stream, supra note 38, at 494.
43. See id. at 500.
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sufficiently address treatment denial decisions.44
Despite such defense of the managed care industry, patient
protection legislation has moved to the forefront of state lawmakers'
agendas.45 Much of this reform legislation has failed, however, not on
the merits of its provisions, but because ERISA preempted it.46 Due
to the uncertainty surrounding a state law's survival of an ERISA
preemption challenge, health care reform has remained relatively
stagnant. Examining the evolving operation of ERISA's preemption
clause provides a helpful background for discussing the current
challenges facing state health care reform.
III. ERISA'S IMPACT ON STATE HEALTH CARE REFORM
A. ERISA 's Preemption Clause
Prior to ERISA's enactment in 1974, employee benefit law lacked
uniformity among the states, thereby burdening employers with
inconsistent legal standards concerning the establishment, operation,
and administration of employee benefit plans.47 Congress responded
44. See id. at 497-98.
45. In 1996 and 1997, state legislatures have focused on drafting laws that mandate
coverage for minimum hospital maternity stays and mastectomy stays, as well as laws that
require coverage for breast cancer patients' bone marrow transplants. See Statelines 50-State
Report, supra note 41, at *1-2; American Political Network, Statelines Legislative Update:
South Dakota Through Wyoming, AMER. HEALTH LINE, Jan. 10, 1997, available in Westlaw,
1/10/97 APN-HE 5; American Political Network, Statelines Legislative Update: New Mexico
Through South Carolina, AMER. HEALTH LINE, Jan. 9, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1/9/97
APN-HE 7; American Political Network, Statelines Legislative Updates: Maryland Through
New Jersey, AMER. HEALTH LINE, Jan. 8, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1/8/97 APN-HE 4;
American Political Network, Statelines Legislative Outlooks: Georgia Through Maine, AMER.
HEALTH LINE, Jan. 7, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1/7/97 APN-HE 4; American Political
Network, Statelines Legislative Outlooks: Alabama Through Florida, AMER. HEALTH LINE,
January 6, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1/6197 APN-HE 6.
46. See generally District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125
(1992) (preempting a District of Columbia statute requiring continuation of health coverage);
Insurance Bd. Under Soc. Ins. Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408 (3d Cir.
1987) (preempting a state law that regulated the contents of employee health care benefit
plans); New Jersey Bus. & Indus. Ass'n v. New Jersey, 592 A.2d 660 (N.J. Super. 1991)
(preempting a New Jersey law that required employers to continue providing health benefit
plans for absent employees during authorized periods of family leave).
47. For example, state laws did not prescribe substantive fiduciary standards for those
parties who made decisions regarding the administration of employee benefits plans. In
addition, conflict and choice of law questions constantly arose in litigation of employee benefit
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to this situation by enacting ERISA and, more specifically, by
providing ERISA with a broad preemption clause. Courts have
broadly interpreted ERISA's preemption clause so as to promote the
uniformity of employee benefit laws that Congress sought to achieve
under ERISA.49 Courts have developed a three-part analysis for
determining whether ERISA preempts a state law that affects
employee benefit plans. This analysis considers both the language of
ERISA and Congress's goals in enacting ERISA.50 Specifically, the
preemption analysis addresses: (1) whether a state law "relates to"
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans;5' (2) whether a state law that
relates to ERISA-covered employee benefit plans is exempt from
preemption because it falls within the state's power to regulate
insurance, banking, or securities;52 and (3) whether, in the case of
state insurance regulation, a state law as applied to self-insured
employee benefit plans is nevertheless preempted by operation of
ERISA's deemer clause, which exempts self-insured employee
benefit plans from state insurance regulation.5 3
1. Preemption of State Laws that "Relate to" ERISA-Covered
Employee Benefit Plans
During the twenty years following ERISA's enactment, there have
emerged three categories of state laws that "relate to" ERISA-
covered employee benefit plans and, thus, have been preempted by
ERISA.54 The first category consists of laws that specifically apply to
ERISA plans or that require employers to provide specific coverage
to employees through the employers' ERISA plans. The second
disputes. See FRANK CUMMINGS, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major Claims and
Defenses, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 511, 517-19 (1996).
48. See discussion supra note 6.
49. See discussion supra note 3.
50. See discussion supra note 3.
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
52. See id § 1144(b)(2)(A).
53. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
54. See Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain
ERISA Preemption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255, 263-70 (1996) (outlining the history of major
ERISA preemption cases).
55. See id. at 264. For example, in District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade,
506 U.S. 125 (1992), a District of Columbia workers' compensation provision required that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol53/iss1/6
A UNIFORM PATIENT PROTECTION ACT
category encompasses laws that either mandate a specific structure
for benefit plans or prohibit a method of determining the level of
benefits.56 The third category of laws that "relate to" ERISA includes
laws that impose a duty on ERISA plans by merely referencing
ERISA plans.
57
2. The Preemption Exemption for State Laws that Satisfy
ERISA's Insurance Savings Clause
After determining that a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan,
courts must analyze whether the law falls within ERISA's savings
clause, which exempts from preemption state laws that regulate
insurance,58 banking, or securities. 59 In Metropolitan Life Insurance
employers who provide health insurance to employees maintain coverage equivalent to an
employee's existing coverage while the employee either received or was eligible to receive
workers' compensation benefits. See id at 127 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp.
1992)). The Supreme Court concluded that the workers' compensation statute related to ERISA
plans because it expressly referred to ERISA plans. See id at 130.
56. See Jordan, supra note 55, at 263-65. For example, in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), New Jersey's workers' compensation law prevented employers from
offsetting amounts received by employees through workers' compensation claims against those
employees' pension benefits. See id. at 506 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West Supp.
1980-81)). Because the provision at issue eliminated one of ERISA's permitted methods of
calculating benefits, specifically, integration of pension funds with other "public income
maintenance moneys," the Court concluded that the New Jersey statute related to ERISA plans.
See id. at 524.
57. The Supreme Court endorsed this broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause
in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). In Shaw, the Court declared that "[a] law
'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan." Id at 96-97. In effect, the Court concluded that "Congress
used the words 'relate to' in [section] 514(a) in their broad sense." Id. at 98; see also FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). In Holliday, the Court determined that a Pennsylvania
law that precluded a right of reimbursement or subrogation for benefits available under a tort
claimant's health benefit plan related to ERISA plans and, therefore, was preempted by ERISA.
See id. at 59. The Court found that the law related to ERISA because the law specifically
referred to benefit plans and, therefore, risked subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state
regulations. See id. at 60.
58. The savings clause's exemption for state insurance laws encompasses state laws that
address health care.
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2XA) (1994). ERISA's savings clause provides that "nothing
in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. If a state law does not purport to regulate
insurance, banking, or securities, then a preemption analysis will focus only on whether the law
"relates to" an ERISA plan under section 514(a) of ERISA.
By preserving states' power to regulate insurance, the savings clause ensures consistency
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Co. v. Massachusetts,60 the Supreme Court declared that ERISA's
insurance savings clause will exempt a state law from preemption
only if the state law (1) is specifically directed toward the insurance
industry and, therefore, regulates insurance under a "common sense"
view, (2) has the effect of transferring or spreading risk, (3) regulates
the relationship between the insurer and the insured, and (4) focuses
exclusively upon the insurance industry.61 However, even if a law
between ERISA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994). The
McCarran-Ferguson Act confirms states' authority to regulate insurance. The Act provides, in
relevant part:
(a) State regulation
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance: Provided, That [the federal antitrust laws] shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.
Id. § 1012(a)-(b).
Congress failed to define the phrase "business of insurance" within the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Accordingly, in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), the Supreme
Court set forth three factors for determining whether a practice qualifies as the "business of
insurance": "[Ffirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within
the insurance industry." Id. at 129.
60. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
61. See id. at 740, 743. In Metropolitan Life, a Massachusetts statute required that every
general health insurance policy providing hospital and surgical coverage, and every benefit plan
including such coverage, also provide a minimum level of mental health coverage. See id. at
729-30. In enacting the statute, the Massachusetts legislature sought to combat "adverse
selection" in mental health insurance. See id. at 731. Adverse selection occurred when healthy
individuals, who were considered good insurance risks, declined to purchase mental health
coverage, thereby generating an increase in mental health insurance premiums for people who
otherwise might elect to purchase mental health insurance. See id. By mandating minimum
mental health coverage levels, the Massachusetts legislature aimed to "effectively forc[e] the
good-risk individuals to become part of the risk pool, and [to] enabl[e] insurers to price the
insurance at an average market rather than a market retracted due to adverse selection." Id
In determining that ERISA's insurance savings clause saved the statute from preemption,
the Supreme Court outlined the proper saving clause analysis for determining whether a state
law regulates the "business of insurance." First, the Court adopted a "common-sense view" of
the phrase "regulates insurance," recognizing that it was compelled to "'begin with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose."' Id. at 740 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). Then, upon determining that the state law met
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falls within the savings clause, ERISA will still preempt the law if it
conflicts with ERISA's civil enforcement scheme.
62
3. State Insurance Laws that are Subject to ERISA Preemption as
Applied to Self-Insured Employee Benefit Plans through
ERISA's Deemer Clause
If a state law that regulates the business of insurance survives the
savings clause analysis, courts must still analyze it under ERISA's
"deemer clause." ERISA's deemer clause sets forth exceptions to
ERISA's savings clause that subject employee benefit plans to
ERISA, rather than to state law.63 Specifically, ERISA's deemer
this first requirement, the Court proceeded with the three-part "business of insurance" analysis
articulated in Pireno. See id Later, in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), the
Court clarified that "in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the
insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry." Id. at 50.
62. ERISA's civil enforcement provision, as applied to private causes of action, provides
in relevant part:
A civil action may be brought-
(I) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (C) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
Consistent with its broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause, the Supreme Court
has held that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme precludes a party from bringing a law suit
against an employer under state common law or statutory law if the law suit in any way "relates
to" an ERISA plan. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McLendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (holding
that ERISA preempted the common law wrongful discharge claim of an employee whose
employer discharged him to prevent him from receiving benefits under the employer's ERISA
plan).
63. ERISA's deemer clause provides in relevant part: "Neither an employee benefit plan
... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance.., for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [and] insurance contracts .... 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(bX2)(B). Notably, the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life concluded that ERISA
would preempt the Massachusetts statute as applied to self-insured employers because of
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clause exempts self-insured 64 employers from state insurance
regulation, thereby omitting such employers from the savings
clause's definition of being engaged in the "business of insurance."
65
As self-insured employers are not engaged in the business of
insurance, ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to" ERISA plans
and regulate such employers.
B. The Development of Courts 'Modern Application of the
Preemption Clause
For many years, lower courts inconsistently interpreted Supreme
ERISA's deemer clause. See 471 U.S. at 746-47. Although the Court recognized that its holding
would create inconsistencies by subjecting all employee benefit plans except self-insured plans
to direct and indirect state regulation, see id. at 747, the Court offered no suggestions for
correcting this inconsistency. Instead, the Court stated that "[a]rguments as to the wisdom of
these policy choices must be directed at Congress." Id.
64. In a self-insured plan, an employer pays the employees' health benefit claims out of a
fund reserved for that purpose rather than contracting with private insurance companies and
managed care organizations. The employer, therefore, bears much of the financial risk
associated with its employees' health care expenses. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS-95-167, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES
POSED BY ERISA (1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Gaorpt File [hereinafter "IssuEs,
TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES"]. Although a majority of the employers providing ERISA plans
purchase health care coverage from third-party insurers, approximately forty percent of these
employers adopt self-funded plans, thereby avoiding state insurance regulation. See ISSUES,
TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES at 4. Thus, of the 44% of the United States population
(114,000,000 people in 1995) receiving health coverage from ERISA plans, an estimated
44,000,000 individuals do not receive the protection of state insurance regulation. See id.
65. Self-insured plans' exemption from state regulation has become the subject of
considerable criticism. Some commentators note that self-insured plans' coverage decisions
may lack medical merit because benefits managers in such plans have broad discretion in
allocating health benefits. See Weisenborn, supra note 6, at 155 ("The distinction between self-
funded and commercially-insured plans had led to a subversion of ERISA's purposes and
deprived employees of many benefits necessary for adequate health care."). A Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision illustrates the inadequacy of ERISA's substantive provisions for
protecting self-insured health plan participants and beneficiaries. In McGann v. H & H Music
Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit upheld a self-insured employer's reduction
of lifetime medical coverage for employees with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) from $11,000,000 per participant to $5,000 per participant. See id. at 408. The
employer in McGann made this drastic change in coverage upon learning that one of its
employees had AIDS. See id. The court held that ERISA's exclusive enforcement scheme,
section 502(a) of ERISA, preempted the employee's state law claim. See id. The court reasoned
that ERISA does not require employers to provide health coverage to employees and "does not
prohibit welfare plan discrimination between or among categories of diseases." Id. (emphasis
added).
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Court precedent when applying the above three-part preemption
analysis. As a result, the outcome of litigation concerning state law
viability under ERISA became increasingly unpredictable.66 For
example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United Wire, Metal,
& Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hospital67 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Cuomo68  reached different conclusions when
analyzing ERISA's preemptive effects on two similar state
regulations governing hospital rates.
Under the statute at issue in United Wire, New Jersey imposed a
state-wide surcharge on patients' hospital expenses in order to
provide hospitals with assistance in covering their uncompensated
health care expenses.69 Additionally, the New Jersey statute provided
financial relief to hospitals that incurred economic losses in treating
Medicare patients by enabling such hospitals to assess a surcharge
against non-Medicare patients.70  Several self-insured employee
benefit plans and individual plan participants sought an injunction
66. See Jordan, supra note 54, at 271-81 (analyzing cases in detail).
67. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
68. 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
69. In both United Wire and Travelers, the state hospital rate-setting provisions required
hospitals to charge fixed rates for each patient based upon the patient's diagnosis, rather than
upon the actual cost of the services. See id. at 711 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(3)
(McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1995)); United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
26:2H-1 to -26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992-93)). Hospitals employed a Diagnostic-Related
Group (DRG) methodology to arrive at these figures. The expense of treating an average patient
with a particular initial diagnosis provides the basis for the DRG rate chargeable by a hospital
to provide care for that patient. See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(3) (McKinney
1994 & Supp. 1995). Under the New Jersey statute at issue in United Wire, the DRG rate for a
particular hospital included the weighted average for both that hospital's expenses incurred in
treating a specific condition and the average expense incurred by other New Jersey hospitals in
treating the same condition. See United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189 (noting that under the DRG
system, the hospitals that benefited incurred expenses less than the state average for that
particular DRG service, while the hospitals that experienced financial loss incurred expenses
above the state average for that particular DRG service because hospitals receive only the fixed
DRG rate for procedures performed). In order to provide hospitals with financial assistance to
cover uncompensated health care expenses, the statute imposed a state-wide charge over the
DRG rate, with the revenue providing the appropriate aid to such hospitals. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 26:2H-I to 26:2H-26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992-93).
70. See United Wire, 793 F. Supp. at 527-28. The statute aimed to contain health care
service expenses and maintain hospital financial solvency. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:211-1
(West 1987).
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against the application of the rate-setting scheme to their plans,
arguing that ERISA preempted the statute.71 The District Court of
New Jersey held that the statute related to ERISA plans and,
therefore, warranted preemption because the statute effectively
required self-insured ERISA plans to pay for services provided to
non-members,72 thereby hindering the administration of such plans."
The Third Circuit reversed, however, concluding that the rates too
remotely affected ERISA plans to warrant ERISA preemption.74 The
court reasoned that although ERISA's preemption clause was broad,
it was not so comprehensive that it invalidated any state law that
increased the administrative costs of employee benefit plans.
75
According to the court, such a broad interpretation of ERISA's
preemption clause would erode state police power 76 and give ERISA
plans "a charmed existence that was never contemplated by
Congress.,,77 Rather than adopting such a broad interpretation, the
court acknowledged that most health care regulations would
inevitably have an indirect effect upon ERISA plans78 and adopted a
balancing approach that would implicate ERISA's preemption clause
only when state police power regulations (1) purposely focused on
ERISA plans for special treatment, (2) restricted the choices of such
plans, or (3) detrimentally affected their ability to function in
multiple states.79
In contrast to the United Wire court, the Second Circuit in
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo80 concluded that New York's
hospital rate-setting provisions related to ERISA plans because the
71. See United Wire, 793 F. Supp. at 528.
72. ERISA's deemer clause did not "rescue" the self-insurers from the hospital rate-
setting provisions because the statute did not purport to regulate insurance. See id.
73. See id. at 535-36.
74. See United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1194.
75. See id
76. For a discussion of states' use of their police power to regulate the health and general
welfare of their citizens, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
77. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1194 (citing Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir.
1984)).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1195.
80. 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), aff'g 813 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd sub nom.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645 (1995).
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provisions had the requisite "connection with" ERISA plans to
warrant preemption.81 Like the New Jersey statute in United Wire, the
New York statute imposed a surcharge on HMOs.12 The surcharge
served as a direct payment to the state's general fund rather than as
an increase in hospital rates.83 In addition, the New York statute
assessed a nine percent charge on HMOs that failed to enroll a
requisite number of Medicare patients. 4 Several commercial insurers
and their trade associations filed suit against the state officials, the
New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield ("The
Blues"), and the Hospital Association of New York State, claiming
that ERISA preempted the surcharge statutes.85 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that ERISA
preempted the surcharges imposed by the statute and enjoined the
state from enforcing the surcharges against commercial insurers and
HMOs that provided coverage for ERISA plans.86
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision." The court declared that the surcharges for commercial
insurers could "obviously" impact health care benefits in ERISA
81. See id. at 721. Under New York's rate-setting scheme, the type of health coverage a
patient carried determined the DRG amount that a hospital could charge for the patient's care.
Adjustments to a particular hospital's operating costs affected the amount of DRG charges
allowable with respect to that hospital's operating costs, See id. at 712. The rate schedule
differentiated among throe kinds of payers: (1) those whose rates hinged upon DRG rates,
including the state government paying for Medicaid patients, nonprofit corporations such as
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, and iMOs; (2) those who paid the DRG rates plus a thirteen percent
surcharge, such as self-insured groups that paid hospitals directly and commercial insurers
whose coverage was based on all hospital services rendered; and (3) those who paid actual
hospital charges, including all other payors such as self-paying patients, patients covered by
commercial insurance policies that did not adopt an expense-incurred basis for payment, and
self-insured groups that did not pay hospitals directly. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-
c(lXa)-(C) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
82. See § 2807-c(1Xa)-(c).
83. See Travelers, 813 F. Supp. at 1000.
84. See ja The effect of these provisions was to ensure the economic viability of plans
that provided affordable health coverage to high-risk individuals by offsetting the commercial
insurers' competitive advantage. See id.
85. Seei.
86. See id. at 1012. The court reasoned, "To the extent that the Surcharges impose a
substantial economic burden on the commercial insurers and HMOs which provide services to
employee benefit plans, those Surcharges may [a]ffect the structure and/or the administration of
such plans." l. at 1004. The court concluded, therefore, that the surcharges related to ERISA
plans and, thus, fell within ERISA's preemption clause. See id.
87. See 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993).
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plans.88 Moreover, the court noted that the nine percent assessment
on HMOs that failed to enroll the requisite number of Medicare
patients would interfere with employers' health care coverage choices
for ERISA plans. 89 The court concluded that the surcharges
incorporated into the rate-setting provisions related to ERISA plans
and, therefore, warranted preemption.
90
The Supreme Court, in New York Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co,91 provided the
necessary resolution to the inconsistent decisions of United Wire and
Cuomo. In Travelers, the Court signaled that the time to restrain
ERISA's preemption of state law had arrived. Reversing the decision
of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that ERISA did not
preempt New York's hospital rate-setting schedule.92 The Court
reasoned that the statutes' indirect effect on ERISA plans93 was
insufficient to trigger preemption.94 The Court refused to read
ERISA's preemption clause so broadly as to supersede all state laws
88. See id
89. See id.
90. Seeid. at 721.
91. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
92. See id at 662.
93. Specifically, the statutes increased the attractiveness of the Blues' plans in light of the
additional charges imposed upon patients of commercial insurers and HMOs.
94. See id at 660. First, the Court reaffirmed that the basic purpose of ERISA's
preemption clause was "to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans." Id. at 657. Second, the Court noted that
preemption should occur only if a state law mandated employee benefit structures or
administration, or if it provided for an alternative enforcement mechanism. See id. at 658. The
Court found that the purpose and the effects of the New York surcharge statutes distinguished
this case from the cases in which preemption was proper. See id. Third, the Court noted that the
statutes' effect of making the Blues more attractive as insurance alternatives indirectly followed
from the purpose of the rate-setting provisions, which was to preserve the viability of "open
enrollment" insurers who provided coverage for high-risk individuals. See id. at 658-59. The
Court stated that the Surcharges' creation of economic incentives for choosing one insurer over
another
[did] not bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself. ... Nor does the indirect influence of the
surcharges preclude uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform
interstate benefit package if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply bears on the costs
of benefits and the relative costs of competing insurance to provide them. It is an
influence that can affect a plan's shopping decisions, but it does not affect the fact that
any plan will shop for the best deal it can get, surcharges or no surcharges.
Id. at 659-60.
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and charges merely because they indirectly relate to ERISA plans that
purchase insurance or HMO memberships providing the same
services. 95 The Court declared that "nothing in the language of the
Act or the context of its passages indicates that Congress chose to
displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a
matter of local concern ..... 9 Although the Court held that ERISA
would not preempt a state law that produces an economic effect that
at most would influence decisions concerning benefit structure or
administrative schemes, it left open the possibility that "a state law
might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent
or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and
that such a state law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514."59 7
Thus, the Travelers Court left somewhat unresolved the "indirect
effect" question of ERISA preemption.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions confirm the Court's shift to
a more restrained application of ERISA's preemption clause. In
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, Inc.,98 the Court held that California's prevailing wage
95. See id at 659-60.
96. Id. at 661. The Court noted that ERISA's preemption of New York's rate-setting
statutes would "bar any state regulation of hospital costs," i d at 664 (emphasis added),
including a basic DRG system free of surcharges. See id. The Court found this prospect
unacceptable for two reasons. First, several states, including New York, had regulated hospital
charges in some manner at the time of ERISA's enactment in 1974. See id. at 665. In addition,
the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA) provided
grant opportunities to states "for the purpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of State
Agencies regulating rates for the provision of health care... within the State." Id. at 666
(quoting National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
641, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 2225, 2249, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799).
The Court concluded, therefore, that the federal government's encouragement of rate-setting,
through the NHPRDA's provision providing aid for state health care regulations, was "simply
incompatible with preemption of the same by ERISA." Id. at 667. The Travelers Court also
confirmed that its limitation on ERISA's preemption clause was consistent with its precedent of
declining to find preemption when state law authorized an indirect source of administrative
cost. See id. at 662 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825,
831-32 (1988) (holding that ERISA did not preempt Georgia's general garnishment statute,
which could apply to participants' benefits under ERISA welfare benefit plans)).
97. Id. at 668. For example, the Court noted that "there might be a point at which an
exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson's choice would be treated as imposing a
substantive mandate .... " Id. at 664.
98. 117 S. Ct 832 (1997).
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law did not "relate to" ERISA and, therefore, was not preempted by
ERISA.99 The statute at issue in Dillingham mandated that
contractors on a public works projects pay their workers "the
prevailing wage in the project's locale. ''l °° However, the statute
carved out an exception for workers who participated in approved
apprenticeship programs, permitting the contractor to pay such
workers a lower wage.101 Relying on Travelers, the Court looked to
"ERISA's objectives as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive, and to the nature of the law's
effect on ERISA plans ..... 102 The Court drew a parallel between
California's wage law and the rate-setting provisions at issue in
Travelers, noting that states had long regulated wages paid on state
public works and apprenticeship standards. 10 3 The Court also noted
that the apprenticeship portion of the statute "[did] not bind ERISA
plans to anything,"' 4 and that, like New York's rate-setting
provisions, California's wage law impacted the incentives, rather than
the choices, facing ERISA plans.1
0 5
The Supreme Court reconfirmed its unwillingness to apply
ERISA's preemption clause so broadly as to disturb state police
power to regulate health care in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund.10 6 In DeBuono, the Court evaluated New
York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA), which taxed the gross
receipts for patient services at treatment and diagnostic centers.
Rather than looking to the text of ERISA's preemption clause, the
Court followed the Travelers approach of examining ERISA's
objectives and concluded that the HFA was not the type of state law
99. See iad at 842.
100. d at 835.
101. See id.
102. Id at 834 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 646,654).
103. Seeid at841.
104. Id at841.
105. See id. The Court also noted that, like the rate-setting provisions in Travelers, the
wage statute was '"no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local
regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate."' Id. at 842 (quoting
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668). Thus, the Court concluded that "[w]e could not hold pre-empted a
state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing
grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended nothing of the sort." Id.
106. 117S. Ct. 1747, 1752-53 (1997).
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that Congress intended to preempt. 10 7 Specifically, the Court noted
that the HFA fell within an area traditionally regulated by the states,
namely, health and welfare.108
The Travelers progeny has addressed the importance of
preserving the state police power in regulating the general health and
welfare of citizens.1' 9 However, these cases offer little guidance in
answering preemption questions regarding state laws that regulate
107. See id. at 1751. The Court confirmed its rejection of a "strictly literal" reading of
ERISA's preemption clause, because the "'relates to' language was not intended to modify 'the
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law."' Id. (quoting
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654).
108. See id Moreover, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that the -FA
was distinguishable from the rate-setting provisions in Travelers because the -FA directly
impacted benefit plans. See id. at 1752. The Second Circuit concluded that the HFA related to
ERISA plans because it reduced the amount of fund assets that would be available for benefits
by assessing a tax on "'payments and contributions which were intended to pay for participants'
medical benefits .... Id. at 1750 (quoting NYSA-ILA Medical and Services Fund v. Axelrod,
27 F.3d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1994)). The Second Circuit also determined that this reduction in
assets could result in fewer benefits or higher fees for plan participants. See id. In response, the
Supreme Court emphasized that had the plaintiff benefit plan trustees chosen to purchase
medical services indirectly through an independent hospital, rather than providing those
benefits directly, the HFA's impact would have been identical. See id. at 1752-53. Specifically,
the Court noted that independent hospitals would have increased their rates in order to pass the
-FA costs on to the fund. See id at 1752. Therefore, the HFA's impact, though indirect, would
have been the same "in all relevant aspects." Id. at 1752-53.
109. See Jordan, supra note 54, at 286-91. Jordan suggests that Travelers established the
proper ERISA preemption analysis for ameliorating the inconsistency that developed in ERISA
preemption litigation prior to Travelers. Jordan asserts that Travelers indicated a "tighter
standard for determining pre-emption in that category of cases where the state law affects the
benefit structure or administrative practices of an ERISA plan." Id. at 286. The preemption
question then turns upon whether the effect of the state law "actually or practically binds
choices as to benefit packages or structures or administrative practices." Id. at 287. Moreover,
both the purpose and the effect of the state law are relevant to determining preemption. If the
focus of the state law in question is health policy, as it was in Travelers, then preemption is less
likely. See id. at 288.
Jordan also suggests that "the fact that an indirect economic effect falls primarily upon
ERISA plans or that the underlying objective of state law could not be achieved without the
disparate impact on ERISA plans does not support a finding of preemption." Id. at 289.
Additionally, Jordan argues that courts should adopt a narrower view of the underlying
objective of ERISA. Jordan cites as an example of such a view the Supreme Court's opinion in
Travelers, which indicates a strong presumption against preemption for state laws that fall
within traditional state police power, such as health care regulations. See id. at 289 (citing
Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1681). Jordan concludes that "[mI]ere interference is not sufficient; a
state law must bind choices as to administrative practices." Id. The Supreme Court's decisions
in DeBuono and Dillingham support this analysis. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and
Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
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health care indirectly through insurance regulation t10 Such measures
that survive ERISA preemption through the insurance savings clause
continue to create significant discrepancies in the legal rights
afforded to participants in third-party payor, as opposed to self-
insured, benefit plans. Specifically, ERISA's savings clause
empowers states to regulate the former, but ERISA's deemer clause
operates to leave the latter unregulated."i ' Neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has addressed this discrepancy. Meanwhile, state health
care reform efforts continue to spark controversy over the proper
balance between uniform employee benefit laws and the states'
power to enact such reform measures. State health care reform efforts
also continue to engender debate over the proper balance between
cost-efficiency and quality in health care. This controversy is
manifest in the current debate surrounding state "any willing
provider" statutes.
C. The "Any Willing Provider" Debate: An Illustration ofERISA 's
Recent Preemptive Effect on State Health Care Reform
"Any willing provider" statutes require managed care
organizations to accept as a covered health care provider any provider
who wishes to join the managed care network and meets the
network's selection criteria 12 Proponents of these statutes emphasize
110. Much of the legislation that affects the managed care industry falls within this
category. For a discussion of state legislative efforts to address quality of care issues that have
arisen in managed care plans, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text
111. For a discussion of ERISA's insurance savings clause and deemer clause, see supra
notes 59-61, 63-65 and accompanying text.
112. These statutes typically fall within one of four categories:
"[1] "freedom of choice" laws that require insurers to reimburse a non-network
provider as long as the provider agrees to accept the insurer's level of reimbursement
for the service; ... [2] "mandatory admittance" laws that require insurers to include in
a network any provider willing to abide by the terms and conditions of the network,
including price; ... [3] "due process" laws that require insurers to follow certain
procedures in creating and maintaining a network, such as publishing the criterion for
participation in the network and providing for an appeal process in the event of
termination of a provider from participation in a network; ... [4] "essential community
provider" laws that require insurance networks to contract with essential community
providers serving medically needy, poor populations, e.g. community health centers
and AIDS providers."
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that any willing provider laws enable employees whose employers
provide health care coverage through managed care networks to
choose physicians and other health care providers who are not part of
the managed network.Y3 Proponents also emphasize that health care
practitioners who have found themselves excluded from such
networks can continue to maintain profitable practices rather than
lose their patients to HMOs and PPOs. n 4 On the other hand, critics of
any willing provider laws argue that requiring managed care
networks to accept such practitioners erodes the networks' ability to
provide health care at a discount and, thus, threatens to raise
premiums.'
5
Francesconi, supra note 27, at 230 n. I1 (quoting Andrew L. Jiranek & Susan D. Baker, "Any
Willing Provider" Laws: Regulating the Health Care Provider's Contractual Relationship with
the Insurance Company, HEALTH LAW. (ABA Forum on Health Law), Winter 1994-1995, at 3).
113. See Hancock, supra note 6, at 404. For example, suppose that Employee A's employer
has provided health coverage under a traditional indemnification insurance policy for the past
twelve years. A and A's family have seen the same primary care physician for those twelve
years. A's employer then announces that it has joined a managed care network, and that, in the
future, A and A's family must see one of the health care providers within the network in order
to receive coverage. Suppose also that A's family physician does not belong to the network. If
A or someone in A's family has a particular condition for which the family physician has
consistently provided treatment, an any willing provider law would enable A and A's family to
continue seeing that physician, but only if the physician agrees to abide by the terms of the
network when treating A and A's family.
114. See id. at 406. For example, in rural areas, the number of available health care
practitioners is limited. If an employer with a branch office in a smaller community shifts its
employee benefit health plan to a managed care network, the economic impact on a physician
who has not been asked to join the network may be devastating.
115. See, e.g., Francesconi, supra note 27, at 248-49 n.86 (discussing the impact of any
willing provider laws on the economic foundations of PPOs). Francesconi observes that under
any willing provider statutes, "the number of providers in the preferential arrangement is
mandated by the any willing provider law rather than determined by factors of economic
efficiency." Id. at 249.
Four primary arguments against the statutes have emerged. First, critics argue that managed
care organizations' ability to contract selectively with health care providers, and thereby obtain
volume discounts for their enrollees, suffers drastically. See Recent Legislation, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 2122, 2125 (1996). Thus, as more enrollees seek health care from providers outside of
their network who agree to abide by their network's terms, HMOs in particular will lose
bargaining power in negotiating with providers to join the network because the number of
guaranteed patients will decrease. As a result, premiums for coverage with such managed care
organizations will increase so that networks can remain profitable. See id. Second, critics argue
that administrative expenses for managed care organizations, especially IMOs, will increase as
the number of providers that the networks oversee increases. See id. Third, opponents argue that
any willing provider statutes could cause significant increases in the expenses associated with
establishing HMOs in states with low ratios of liMOs. See id. Fourth, HMOs potentially can set
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These opposing interests recently have culminated in a significant
amount of litigation as opponents of the statutes have challenged the
statutes' viability under ERISA's preemption clause. This rise in
litigation started at nearly the same time as the rise in litigation
involving hospital rate-setting statutes; however, unlike the rate-
setting statutes, the ultimate status of any willing provider laws under
ERISA's preemption clause remains unresolved. An examination of
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' different approaches to ERISA's
preemptive effect on any willing provider statutes sheds light on the
opposing ideologies regarding the role of ERISA in state health care
reform.
In Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 1
6
the Fourth Circuit considered whether ERISA preempted Virginia's
any willing provider statute, which prohibited insurance companies
from unreasonably discriminating against health care providers in
establishing PPOs." 7 Aetna Life Insurance Company, which had
their network qualification standards higher in order to include very few providers. See
Applying Physician Criteria Protects Against AWP Risk, PHYSICIAN MANAGER, Apr. 7, 1995.
Such tactics, however, ultimately may provide little economic benefit to HMOs as the health
care providers who meet more selective network qualification standards are likely to expect
higher payments per patient than less "decorated" providers. See Recent Legislation, supra, at
2126. Consequently, the discounts that normally inhere in HiMOs may suffer nonetheless. See
id
Such criticism has drawn considerable support from entities outside of the managed care
industry. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has issued a letter warning of the anti-
competitive effects of any willing provider legislation in some states, and both the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners and the National Governors Association have issued
statements opposing any willing provider statutes because of potential harm to consumers in the
form of increased costs. See American Political Network, Inc., Access/Quality/Cost "Any
Willing Provider". Past Applies to Future Legislation, AMER. HEALTH LINE, September 24,
1996, available in Westlaw, 9/24/96 APN-HE 14 [hereinafter Access/Qualiy/Cost].
116. 800 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Va. 1992), vacated, 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993).
117. See Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 501. The Virginia statute stated in relevant part:
A. One or more insurers may offer or administer a health benefit program under which
the insurer or insurers may offer preferred provider policies or contracts that limit the
numbers and types of providers of health care services eligible for payment as
preferred providers.
B. Any such insurer shall establish terms and conditions that shall be met by a hospital,
physician or type of provider listed in § 38.2-3408 in order to qualify for payment as a
preferred provider under the policies or contracts. These terms and conditions shall not
discriminate unreasonably against or among such health providers. No hospital,
physician or type of provider listed in § 38.2-3408 willing to meet the terms and
conditions offered to it or him shall be excluded.
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established a PPO in Richmond, Virginia as part of its employee
benefit package, did not designate Stuart Circle Hospital as one of its
PPO provider facilities, despite the hospital's willingness to comply
with Aetna's terms. 1 8 When Stuart Circle brought suit against Aetna
for violating the Virginia statute, Aetna responded that ERISA
preempted the statute. "9 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia concluded that Virginia's any willing provider statute related
to employee benefits plans and, therefore, was preempted by
ERISA.1
20
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the statute related to employee benefit plans.
121
However, in its savings clause analysis, the court concluded that the
statute regulated the "business of insurance"2 and, therefore, was
E. For purposes of this section, "preferred provider policies or contracts" are insurance
policies or contracts that specify how services are to be covered when rendered by
preferred and nonpreferred classifications of providers.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407 (Michie 1994), quoted in Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 501.
118. See Stuart Circle, 800 F. Supp. at 329.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 337. The district court cited other district court decisions that had held that
state laws regulating PPOs "relate to" employee benefit plans and, therefore, are preempted by
ERISA. See id. at 332-33. Next, the court rejected the hospital's argument that the statute
satisfied the Supreme Court's test for regulating the "business of insurance" within the meaning
of ERISA's insurance savings clause. See id. at 334.
121. See Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 502. The court noted that the statute applied to "health
benefit programs" operated by insurers and that the statute expressly addressed the benefits that
an insured could receive from the insurer's PPO. See id. Thus, the court concluded that the
statute restricted an insurance company's ability "to limit the choices of providers that
otherwise would confine the participants of an employee benefit health plan to those preferred
by the insurer." Id.
122. The court found that the statute regulated the 'relationship between the insurer and
insured [and] the type of policy which could be issued."' Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 (1985)). Therefore, the court reasoned that the statute
regulated insurance in the "common-sense view" because it prohibited an insurer's
"unreasonable restriction of the insured's choice of physician and hospital," id. at 503, even
though such regulation occurred indirectly through the PPO's structure. See id. Additionally,
the court concluded that the statute met each of the three factors of the Metropolitan Life test for
interpreting the phrase "business of insurance." See Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 502 (citing
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743-44). First, the Virginia statute had the effect of transferring
or spreading the policyholder's risk by prohibiting unreasonable restrictions on providers. See
id. at 503 (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743). Second, the court found that the statute
addressed an 'integral pert of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured,"' id.
at 503 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743), because it regulated treatment and cost,
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not preempted by ERISA.'2 The court thus concluded that the
Virginia legislature's decision to afford a greater degree of protection
to preserving an insured's choice of doctors and hospitals than to
preserving low insurance premiums did not warrant preemption by
ERISA. The court declared that "the wisdom of this decision is a
concern of the legislature, not the judiciary.' 124
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has twice
concluded that ERISA preempts any willing provider legislation. In
CIGNA Health Plan, Inc. v. Louisiana,125 the district court examined
Louisiana's any willing provider statute, which prohibited PPOs from
excluding any licensed provider, other than a hospital, if the provider
agreed to the PPO's terms and conditions. 126 The provisions of the
statute indicated that it applied not only to the insurance industry, but
also to entities such as Taft-Hartley trusts and employers who
established, or participated in, self-funded trusts or programs that
contracted with health care providers. 127 CIGNA Health Plan of
Louisiana ("CIGNA") and Connecticut General Life Insurance
Company (CGLIC), both of which qualified as "group purchasers"
under the statute, challenged the statute's viability under ERISA's
both of which were important elements of health insurance. See id. at 503. Finally, the statute
was ."limited to entities within the insurance industry,"' id. at 504 (quoting Metropolitan Life,
471 U.S. at 743), by its own terms. See id. at 504.
123. See id. at 503.
124. Id at 504-05.
125. 883 F. Supp. 94 (M.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
126. See id. at 95 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(C) (West 1992)), Specifically,
the statute provided that "[n]o licensed provider, other than a hospital, who agrees to the terms
and conditions of the preferred provider contract shall be denied the right to become a preferred
provider to offer health services within the limits of his license." § 40:2202(5)(C).
127. See CIGNA, 82 F.3d at 645 n.10 (citing § 40:2202(3)). References to these entities
appeared in the statute's section that defined "group purchaser" for the purpose of identifying
PPOs. See id. The statute defined "group purchaser" as follows:
(3) "Group purchaser" shall mean an organization or entity which contracts with
providers for the purpose of establishing a preferred provider organization. "Group
purchaser" may include:
(a) Entities which contract for the benefit of their insured employees, or members
such as insurers, self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts, or employers who
establish or participate in self-funded trusts or programs.
(b) Entities which serve as brokers for the formation of such contracts, including
health care financiers, third party administrators, providers or other intermediaries.
Id. (quoting § 40:2202(3)).
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preemption clause. The district court granted summary judgment for
CIGNA and CGLIC, concluding that ERISA preempted the statute to
the extent that it related to employee benefit plans covered under
ERISA.'
21
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision.' After taking into account the Travelers opinion, the court
analyzed the Louisiana statute by broadly interpreting ERISA's
preemption clause and narrowly interpreting ERISA's insurance
savings clause.130 Within this framework, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the statute related to ERISA plans because it referred to ERISA-
qualified plans, 13 1 and because it "mandat[ed] employee benefit
structures or their administration."' 32 Acknowledging that the ERISA
128. See CIGNA, 883 F. Supp. at 104. The court determined that the statute had a direct
impact on how employers or plan sponsors could structure health benefits under employee
benefit plans. See id at 103. Moreover, the court declared that the statute "explicitly direct[ed]
that [employers or plan sponsors] may not structure their programs so as to exclude any
provider willing and able to participate." Id. The court concluded, therefore, that the statute
related to ERISA plans for preemption purposes. See id.
Next, the court analyzed whether the statute regulated the "business of insurance" under
ERISA's savings clause. The court determined that the statute did not fit within the "common
sense" definition of "regulating insurance" because the statute was not "specifically directed
toward the insurance industry, but, rather, it expressly applie[d] to entities outside the insurance
industry, such as employers and Taft-Hartley trusts." Id. at 104 (citing § 40:2202(3)(a)-(b)).
129. See CIGNA, 82 F.3d at 650.
130. See id. at 647. First, the court confirmed that ERISA would preempt state laws that
"'mandat[e] employee benefit structures or their administration."' Id. (brackets in original)
(quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995)). Next, the court strictly construed the Travelers Court's declaration
that ERISA would not preempt state laws having "'only an indirect economic effect on the
relative costs of various health insurance packages' available to ERISA-qualified plans." Id. at
647 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662). Finally, the court emphasized that preemption "stops
short of 'any law of any State which regulates insurance."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651 ).
131. See id. Specifically, the court noted that within the statute's definition of a preferred
provider contract, group purchasers included entities such as 'Taft-Hartley trusts or employers
who establish or participate in self funded trusts or programs,' which 'contract [with health care
providers] for the benefit of their ... employees."' Id. at 648 (brackets in original) (quoting
§ 40:2202(3Xa)). Because the court found that ERISA expressly incorporated these entities into
its definition of an "employee welfare benefit plan," See id. at 648 n.34 (discussing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1XA)-(B) (1992)), the court concluded that the any willing provider statute, as part of
Louisiana's Health Care Cost Control Act, expressly referred to ERISA plans and, thus, related
to ERISA plans. See id. at 648.
132. Id. Relying on dicta from the Travelers opinion, the court distinguished Louisiana's
any willing provider statute from the rate-setting statute at issue in Travelers, id. (quoting
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658), emphasizing that Louisiana's statute required that employers
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preemption analysis was not complete, however, the court examined
the statute under ERISA's insurance savings clause. 133 The court
concluded that the statute failed the third prong of the Metropolitan
Life "regulating insurance" test because it applied to entities beyond
the insurance industry.134 Accordingly, the court concluded that
ERISA preempted Louisiana's any willing provider statute.1
35
The Fifth Circuit revisited the issue of ERISA's preemption of
any willing provider statutes in Texas Pharmacy Ass'n v. Prudential
Insurance Co. 136 and concluded that ERISA preempted Texas's
amended any willing provider pharmacy statute. 37 The parties in
Texas Pharmacy did not contest whether the any willing provider
statute related to ERISA plans because, like Louisiana's statute in
CIGNA, it eliminated one method of structuring employee benefit
plans "by prohibiting plans from contracting with pharmacy networks
that exclud[ed] any willing provider."' 138 Instead, the parties disputed
whether the Texas statute was exempt from preemption under
ERISA's insurance savings clause. Relying on CIGNA, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the statute did not fall within ERISA's savings
clause.
139
structure the particular benefits available to their ERISA plan participants in a specific manner.
The court declared that "[fln other words, the Louisiana statute does not merely raise the cost of
the implicated benefits; it delineates their very structure." Id. at 649. The court reasoned that
Louisiana's any willing provider statute limited ERISA plans that chose to offer coverage by
PPOs to "using PPOs of a certain structure-i.e., a structure that includes every willing,
licensed provider." Id. at 648. Additionally, the court noted that while an ERISA plan may elect
not to offer its beneficiaries PPO coverage, "[i]t is sufficient for preemption purposes that the
statute eliminates the choice of one method of structuring benefits." Id.
133. See id. at 649.
134. See id. at 650 (citing § 40:2202(3)(a) - (b)).
135. See id.
136. 105 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1997).
137. See ia at 1042. Prior to the statute's amendments, the District Court for the Western
District of Texas concluded that Texas's any willing provider pharmacy statute fell within
ERISA's savings clause and, therefore, escaped preemption by ERISA. See Texas Pharmacy
Ass'n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 907 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (W.D. Tex. 1995). Crucial to
the district court's holding was the statute's express limitations to the health insurance industry.
See id.
138. Texas Pharmacy, 105 F.3d at 1037.
139. See id.
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The court observed that while the statute's application formerly
was limited to the insurance industry, the statute, as amended, also
applied to managed care plans. 140 The court found, therefore, that the
amended statute was not limited to entities within the insurance
industry and, thus, failed the third prong of the Metropolitan Life
"regulating insurance" test.141 The court recognized that "there is
room to doubt... [whether] ERISA's drafters intended that it would
preempt any-willing-provider statutes."'142 However, considering the
broad scope of ERISA's preemption clause and the lack of guidance
from Congress or the Supreme Court in addressing any willing
provider statutes, the court determined that preemption in this case
140. See id. at 1036 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.52B, § 2(a) (West Supp. 1997)).
The amended statute prohibited a health insurance policy or managed care plan from limiting or
interfering with a beneficiary's choice of pharmacist. See art. 21.52B, § 2(a)(1). The statute also
prohibited these entities from denying a pharmacist the opportunity to participate in the policy
or plan if the pharmacist agreed to meet all terms and requirements of the policy or plan. See id.
§ 2(aX2). The 1995 amendments also added a broad definition of "managed care plans" to
include "a health maintenance organization, a preferred provider organization, or another
organization that, under a contract or other agreement entered into with a participant in the plan
... provides health care benefits .... '" 105 F.3d at 1037 (quoting art. 21.52B, § 1(6)).
141. See id. at 1038. However, the court acknowledged that the original statute, which
affected only insurance policies, would have come within ERISA's savings clause and escaped
preemption. See id at 1040. In analyzing the pre-1995 statute, the Court relied in part on Stuart
Circle in concluding that a statute which affects a policyholder's choice of provider would meet
the first prong of the Metropolitan Life test for spreading risk. See id. at 1041 (discussing Stuart
Circle, 995 F.2d at 503-04). The Texas Pharmacy Court stated:
By requiring policies to give the beneficiary the option of obtaining pharmaceutical
services from any pharmacy, and requiring pharmacy networks to admit any willing
provider, we believe that the prior statute influenced which costs were ultimately borne
by the insurer and which were borne by the beneficiary, and whether insurers would be
willing to offer pharmacy coverage at all.
Id.
Moreover, the court found that Texas's statute affected a policyholder's choice of provider
even more directly than the Virginia statute in Stuart Circle. See id. at 1042. The Texas statute
prohibited insurance policies from
"prohibit[ing] or limiting] a person who is a beneficiary of the policy from selecting a
pharmacy or pharmacist of the person's choice to be a provider under the policy[,]
[from] fumish[ing] pharmaceutical services offered or provided by that policy[,] or
[from] interferfing] with that person's selection of a pharmacy or pharmacist."
Id. (quoting art. 21.52B § 2(aX1)). The court noted that the 1995 amendments had not changed
this provision. See id at 1042 n.39.
142. Id. at 1039.
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was compelled.
143
In the absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, the
ultimate status of any willing provider statutes remains uncertain as
ERISA challenges to any willing provider statutes continue to seep
into federal district courts. Faced with the possibility that ERISA will
preempt these statutes, many state legislatures focusing on health care
reform have shifted their attention away from any willing provider
statutes,44 in favor of other forms of patient protection legislation.
Such alternate patient protection legislation focuses on quality of care
and other consumer interests that may not directly implicate the
administration of employee benefit plans.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF STATE HEALTH
CARE REFORM AND UNIFORM EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAWS
The debate surrounding the viability of any willing provider laws
illustrates two sets of competing interests. First, ERISA's objective of
preserving uniformity in employee benefit laws conflicts directly
with states' interest in enacting health care legislation to target
quality-of-care issues. Determining the necessary balance between
these interests requires an analysis of their respective merits. In
enacting ERISA, Congress sought to encourage employers to provide
employee benefit plans voluntarily by creating a uniform set of
procedures for their administration. 4 5 By drafting a broad preemption
clause, Congress manifested its intent to protect employers from the
burden of inconsistent state law standards.
There must be a limit, however, on the reach of ERISA's
preemption of state law under section 514's "relate to" language.
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, Congress did not
contemplate that ERISA would have the effect of impeding health
143. See id.
144. Although twenty-four states have enacted some form of any willing provider
legislation in the past twenty years, the majority of these statutes do not extend to cover
physicians, unlike those that have faced strong ERISA challenges. See Access/Quality/Cost,
supra note 120, at *2. In 1994, nine states enacted any willing provider legislation; however, in
1995 and 1996, only three states enacted such legislation. See id.
145. For a discussion of the goals underlying ERISA, see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
146. See supra note 6.
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care reform efforts. 147 In the Travelers progeny, the Supreme Court
correctly articulated that state laws that have only an indirect effect
on the administration of employee benefit plans do not "relate to"
ERISA plans and, therefore, should not be preempted.1
48
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that Congress did not intend
for section 514 of ERISA to displace general health care regulation,
an area traditionally of local concern.1
49
Assuming, however, that states should have the option to fashion
health care reform measures so long as they do not directly affect
ERISA plans or, in the alternative, so long as they fit within ERISA's
savings clause for regulating the "business of insurance,"'"5 ERISA
still presents a significant obstacle to health care reform. As Stuart
Circle, Cigna, and Texas Pharmacy indicate, any willing provider
statutes and, presumably, other patient protection statues that
exclusively target the health insurance industry will survive an
ERISA preemption challenge through operation of the insurance
savings clause.' 5' Employers who self-insure, however, remain
exempt from such regulations under ERISA's deemer clause. 152 As a
147. See Hancock, supra note 6, at 405.
148. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 662 (1995). Although the Court left open the possibility that in some limited
circumstances an indirect effect may be so severe as to warrant preemption, see id. at 668, this
Note suggests that in order for preemption to occur, the state law should have a severe effect on
the employee benefit plan.
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), in which the Court addressed the administrative practices of
employee benefit plans that Congress envisioned when enacting ERISA. See id. at 9-11. In Fort
Halifax, a Maine statute required employers to pay a one-time severance pay to employees upon
termination of employment. See id. at 3, 5. After acknowledging that Congress intended
ERISA's sweeping preemption provision to provide employers with uniform administrative
procedures, see id at 11, the Court declared that concer for such uniformity applied only to
benefits that "by nature require[] an ongoing administrative program." Id. The Court reasoned
that a one-time severance payment would "hardly constituteo] the operation of an employee
benefit plan" because the employer would face "no periodic demands on its assets that create a
need for financial coordination and control." Id. at 12; see also Jordan, supra note 54, at 300-
04, for an analysis of practices that constitute "administration of the plan" for preemption
purposes.
149. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1752
(1997).
150. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text
151. See Texas Pharmacy, 105 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (5th Cir. 1997); Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d
500, 502-04 (4th Cir. 1993).
152. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994); see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying
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result, the deemer clause now creates a dichotomy between
commercially insured plan participants and beneficiaries, who receive
the protection of such legislation, and self-insured plan participants
and beneficiaries, who receive no such protection. 53 The deemer
clause initially served an important purpose because Congress sought
to encourage a voluntary system of employee benefit plans when it
enacted ERISA. 154 By shielding multi-state employers who self-
insured from conflicting state insurance laws, the deemer clause
furthered ERISA's objective of establishing uniform employee
benefit laws. However, this dichotomy between plan participants and
beneficiaries of commercially insured employers, as opposed to self-
insured employers, creates the possibility of gross inequity in the
quality of health care that plan participants and beneficiaries receive.
As one of the premises of ERISA is the protection of these parties,155
it is unlikely that Congress intended to create this anomaly.
Some advocates of state-level health care reform have suggested
that Congress pass a limited waiver of ERISA preemption to provide
states with more options for regulating health care. One rationale
for the enactment of such a waiver provision is that successful state
reform efforts could serve as models both for other states' reform
initiatives as well as for subsequent national reform.'57 Although
there is significant support for the proposition that states should serve
as "laboratories" for national health care reform, 158 preemption
text.
153. ERISA provides virtually no substantive rights for health benefit plans. Thus, self-
insured plan participants and beneficiaries get caught in the "regulatory vacuum" that ERISA
has created in the arena of health care. See supra note 7.
154. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 3.
156. See, e.g., Groves, supra note 36, at 613. In 1983, Hawaii's health care program
became the only state program to be exempt from ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A)-(C)
(1994). Under Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393 (Michie 1994),
employers must provide coverage to all full-time employees and contribute at least half of the
health insurance premium for each employee. See id. § 393-13. The primary reason Congress
granted Hawaii a waiver from ERISA preemption was that Hawaii's Act predated ERISA. See
S. REP. No. 97-646, at 17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4580,4595; see also Leon E.
Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERSA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 109, 151-53 (1985) (outlining the legislative history of Congress's decision
to amend ERISA to grant a waiver to Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act).
157. See id.
158. See id.; see also Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing
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waivers would frustrate ERISA's purpose of establishing and
maintaining uniformity in employee benefit laws.159 Moreover,
waivers may actually discourage multi-state employers from
expanding available benefits if variations in state laws burden the
administration of benefit plans. Thus, preserving the underlying goals
of ERISA, while at the same time granting states the opportunity to
reform their health care systems, requires the establishment of a
balance between these conflicting, yet legitimate, interests.
The controversy surrounding recent state health care reform
efforts reflects a second set of competing interests, cost containment
and quality of care in health care delivery. The any willing provider
statutes preempted by ERISA sought to protect consumers by
assuring quality of care, but they failed to achieve the appropriate
balance of these opposing interests. In theory, these broad-reaching
any willing provider laws could provide consumers with one of the
most important protections in health care delivery: choice of
providers. However, the effect of any willing provider statutes may
ultimately work against consumers by increasing premiums and
narrowing coverage. State legislatures seeking to preserve consumer
choice and access to care must therefore craft patient protection
legislation that balances these two important goals.
V. PROPOSAL: A UNIFORM PATIENT PROTECTION ACT
A Uniform Patient Protection Act (UPPA), drafted with the
foregoing concerns in mind, can achieve the proper balance between
(1) uniform employee benefit laws and state health care reform, and
(2) cost containment and quality health care. 160 As an initial step in
drafting the UPPA, the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990); Angelo A. Stio II,
Note, State Government: The Laboratory for National Health Care Reform, 19 SETON HALL
LEGIs. J. 322, 339-64 (1994) (discussing Hawaii's Employer Mandate Model, Florida's
Managed Care Model, and Oregon's Rationing Model).
159. Seesupranote3.
160. Uniform health-related laws have effectively addressed a number of other quality of
care and patient choice issues. See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (1993); UNIF.
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989); UNtF. HEALTH-CARE INFO. ACT (1985); UNIF.
LAW COMM'R'S MODEL HEALTH CARE CONSENT ACT (1982).
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(NAIC) should determine which types of patient protection
provisions are essential at the state level. These provisions should
include, at a minimum, the following: (1) requirements that managed
care organizations disclose, upon consumer request, information
regarding physician qualifications, plan coverage, benefits,
satisfaction statistics, and loss ratios; (2) prohibitions against gag
clauses in physician contracts; (3) mandatory procedures for claim-
denial appeals; and (4) required options for qualifying plan
participants to select specialists such as OB/GYNs as their gatekeeper
physicians.' 61 After determining which issues to address in the
UPPA, the drafters should make efforts to draft provisions that will
not give rise to an ERISA preemption challenge by taking into
account the Supreme Court's deference to state police power as
discussed in DeBuono,'62 its "indirect effect" analysis in Travelers,163
and its test for regulating the business of insurance under
Metropolitan Life.' 64
The drafters of the UPPA should abide by the judicially
interpreted constraints of ERISA's preemption clause to ensure the
UPPA's viability. Under the Travelers progeny, 165 UPPA provisions
such as IMO disclosure requirements and gag clause prohibitions
should survive a preemption challenge because of their minimal
effect on the administration of employee benefit plans. HMO
disclosure requirements would require managed care organizations to
provide consumers with already available information regarding the
operation and conditions of health plans. Moreover, removing gag
clauses from physician contracts would require little administrative
effort.
In addition, UPPA provisions imposing procedural requirements
for claim-denial appeals and requirements that patients have the
161. Providing this option will enable plan participants to choose gatekeepers who have the
most intimate knowledge of their personal health.
162. 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1751 (1997).
163. 514U.S. 645,659(1995).
164. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724,738-39 (1985).
165. See generally DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747
(1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., 117 S. Ct.
832 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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option of choosing specialists as their gatekeeper physicians should
fall within ERISA's savings clause because they regulate the business
of insurance. 166 Such provisions regulate insurance in the "common
sense view"' 167 because they specifically target the insurance industry.
These provisions also regulate the business of insurance because they
spread risk by allocating the cost component of policyholders' risks
among all insureds to provide an appeals process and to enable
patients to choose approved specialists as their gatekeepers. 168 In
addition, because managed care insurers determine their enrollees'
choice of providers and because claims decisions and appeals deal
exclusively with patients, insurers, and plan managers, these
provisions regulate the relationship between the insurer and the
insured. 169 Finally, the UPPA drafters should limit the application of
the terms of those provisions to entities within the "insurance
industry.'
170
State legislatures would have an incentive to follow the UPPA as
closely as possible so as to maintain its uniformity. While such
deference to the UPPA provisions will necessarily require that states
sacrifice some measure of their freedom to craft unique legislation,
the UPPA ultimately will allow states to effectuate, rather than
merely attempt, patient-oriented health care reform. Additionally, as
long as states adhere closely to the UPPA, multi-state employers
essentially will have only two legal standards with which they need
to comply, namely, the law of states that have adopted the Act and
the law of states that have not. Moreover, as representatives from all
states will play a role in developing the provisions of the UPPA, the
Act likely will represent state interests without overstepping the
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) (1988). For a discussion of the "business of insurance"
test under ERISA's savings clause, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
167. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,740 (1985).
168. Cf Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500, 503 (4th
Cir. 1993) ("By its prohibition against unreasonable restriction of providers, the Virginia
Statute spreads the cost component of the policyholder's risk among all the insureds, instead of
requiring the policyholder to shoulder all or part of this cost when seeking care or treatment
from an excluded doctor or hospital of his or her choice.").
169. Cf Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (noting that mandated benefit laws regulate "an
integral part of the relationship between the insurer and the policy holder" by limiting the type
of coverage that an insurer may sell to the policyholder).
170. See ia2
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boundaries of ERISA's limitations.
Additionally, to ameliorate the injustice caused by ERISA's
deemer clause,' 7' it is imperative that Congress provide adequate
safeguards for self-insured benefit plan participants and plan
beneficiaries. Toward this end, the NAIC and the NCSL should
submit to Congress a list of guidelines, consistent with the objectives
targeted in the UPPA, for establishing "certification requirements"
for self-insured employers. Congress then should amend ERISA to
require self-insured employers to meet these certification guidelines
in order to receive their exemption from state insurance regulation.
7 2
Requiring such certification will ensure substantially similar
protection for individuals covered under the UPPA who receive
coverage through commercial insurers and managed care
organizations. Such certification requirements will also promote
uniform employee benefit laws, which are vital to multi-state
employers who provide health benefit plans to their employees.
Finally, requiring such certification will further ERISA's principal
objective of protecting the beneficiaries of employee benefit plans.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since Congress enacted
ERISA. As the cost of health care steadily has increased, managed
care has served an important function by establishing a framework
under which consumers can receive affordable health care. However,
there inheres in managed care organizations a conflict between cost-
containment practices and the quality of care that patients receive.
This conflict has generated much controversy between the managed
care industry and consumers, necessitating consumer-focused
legislation to temper the economically driven administration of
managed care health plans. A Uniform Patient Protection Act, drafted
within the boundaries of ERISA and designed to address consumer
concerns such as access to information, will provide the necessary
171. See supra notes 63-65, 151-55 and accompanying text.
172. See American Political Network, The Playing Field Reforming States Group:
Promoting "New Federalism, " AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, available in Westlaw, 2/3/95 APN-
HE 10.
173. See supra note 3.
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balance between uniform employee benefit laws and state health care
reform. Moreover, a Uniform Patient Protection Act ultimately may
serve as a catalyst for comprehensive health care reform on a national
level.
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